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GORSUCH’S PURGATORY: ATTEMPTING TO 
DEFINE DEBT COLLECTOR UNDER THE FAIR 
DEBT COLLECTION PRACTICES ACT 
Matthew D. Haan* 
INTRODUCTION 
A whopping seventy million consumers in the United States are 
the subjects of debt collection activities.1 As of March 2017, debt 
collection was an $11.4 billion industry nationwide.2 Debt collection 
affects almost one-third of American consumers, and almost three-
fourths of these consumers have two or more debts out for 
collection.3 The majority of debts originate from credit or charge 
cards.4 In a survey conducted by the Consumer Financial Protection 
Bureau (CFPB), nearly half of the consumers who were contacted 
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to all of the members of the Georgia State University Law Review for the relentless hard work that went 
into this Note and in general. 
 1. CFPB Survey Finds Over One-in-Four Consumers Contacted by Debt Collectors Feel 
Threatened, CFPB (Jan. 12, 2017), https://www.consumerfinance.gov/about-us/newsroom/cfpb-survey-
finds-over-one-four-consumers-contacted-debt-collectors-feel-threatened/ [https://perma.cc/P689-543F] 
[hereinafter CFPB Survey]. 
 2. CFPB, FAIR DEBT COLLECTION PRACTICES ACT: CFPB ANNUAL REPORT 2017, at 9 (2017), 
https://s3.amazonaws.com/files.consumerfinance.gov/f/documents/201703_cfpb_Fair-Debt-Collection-
Practices-Act-Annual-Report.pdf [https://perma.cc/3ZFK-9G54] [hereinafter CFPB 2017]. The number 
of consumers affected by debt collection has more than doubled in the past four years—in 2013, the 
CFPB reported that thirty million consumers were subject to debt collection activities. CFPB, FAIR 
DEBT COLLECTION PRACTICES ACT: CFPB ANNUAL REPORT 2013, at 2 (2013), 
http://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/201303_cfpb_March_FDCPA_Report1.pdf [https://perma.cc/77MX-
3N3D]. 
 3. CFPB, CONSUMER EXPERIENCES WITH DEBT COLLECTION: FINDINGS FROM THE CFPB’S 
SURVEY OF CONSUMER VIEWS ON DEBT, at 5 (2017), 
https://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/documents/201701_cfpb_Debt-Collection-Survey-Report.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/F99P-U3ZL]. The majority of consumers with more than one debt out for collection 
are between thirty-five and forty-nine years old, but debt collection affects all age groups. Id. at 17. 
 4. Id. at 19. Student loans are the second most common type of debt reported with credit or charge 
cards and student loans comprising nearly 75% of all reported debts. Id. 
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about a debt by a debt collector indicated that they requested that the 
debt collector stop contacting them.5 Three-fourths of consumers in 
this group reported that the debt collector did not honor their 
requests.6 The federal Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA) 
makes it illegal for debt collectors to use certain tactics and contact 
debtors at certain times and places and provides opportunities for 
harmed consumers to seek redress.7 The FDCPA, a strict liability 
statute, creates a private right of action that allows consumers to 
collect up to $1,000 in statutory damages if they can prove that the 
debt collector did not collect, or attempt to collect, the debts in 
accordance with the statute.8 
In June 2017, the Supreme Court’s decision in Henson v. 
Santander Consumer USA, Inc. made it harder for consumers to seek 
redress from certain entities when it definitively ruled that those who 
purchase debt profiles and subsequently attempt to collect on them 
are not debt collectors under the statute.9 The Court’s analysis 
                                                                                                                 
 5. CFPB Survey, supra note 1. 
 6. Id. The CFPB also reported that, in general, over 25% of consumers contacted about a debt felt 
threatened. Id. 
 7. See 15 U.S.C. § 1692k(a) (2012). The FDCPA is a strict liability statute, making any debt 
collector who fails to comply with any section of the Act with respect to a consumer liable to that 
consumer in an amount equal to: 
(1) any actual damage sustained by such person as a result of such failure; 
(2)(A) in the case of any action by an individual, such additional damages as the 
court may allow, but not exceeding $1,000; or (B) in the case of a class action, 
(i) such amount for each named plaintiff as could be recovered under 
subparagraph (A), and (ii) such amount as the court may allow for all other class 
members, without regard to a minimum individual recovery, not to exceed the 
lesser of $500,000 or 1 per centum of the net worth of the debt collector; and 
(3) in the case of any successful action to enforce the foregoing liability, the 
costs of the action, together with a reasonable attorney’s fee as determined by the 
court. On a finding by the court that an action under this section was brought in 
bad faith and for the purpose of harassment, the court may award to the 
defendant attorney’s fees reasonable in relation to the work expended and costs. 
Id. However, the Act provides that a debt collector may not be liable if it can show “by a preponderance 
of evidence that the violation was not intentional” and was the result of a bona fide error. Id. § 1692k(c). 
 8. See id. § 1692k. Black’s Law Dictionary defines strict liability as “[l]iability that does not 
depend on proof of negligence or intent to do harm but that is based instead on a duty to compensate the 
harms proximately caused by the activity or behavior subject to the liability rule.” Strict Liability, 
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014). 
 9. Henson v. Santander Consumer USA, Inc., 137 S. Ct. 1718, 1721–22 (2017). The unanimous 
opinion was the first written by Justice Gorsuch. Ryan Lovelace, Neil Gorsuch Writes First Opinion as 
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focused on one statutory definition of a debt collector as one who 
collects debts “owed . . . another.”10 The Court reasoned that because 
debt purchasers become the owners of these debts, they are 
attempting to collect debts owed to themselves, not debts 
“owed . . . another.”11 However, the Court addressed only one 
definition of debt collector under the FDCPA, thus leaving 
unanswered the question of whether debt purchasers are subject to 
the other statutory definition of debt collector. Under the other 
definition, a debt collector is one whose principal business purpose is 
the collection of debt.12 This Note analyzes the legal ramifications of 
the Supreme Court’s decision and proposes a solution that provides 
clarity for consumers, debt collectors, and creditors. 
Part I of this Note provides background on the FDCPA and the 
federal agencies charged with its enforcement.13 Part I also provides 
background on judicial analysis of the FDCPA before Henson v. 
Santander and explains the nature of the Supreme Court’s decision.14 
Part II analyzes the ramifications of Henson v. Santander for debtors 
and debt purchasers.15 Part II also analyzes how the Supreme Court’s 
decision can affect the CFPB.16 Part III proposes and discusses a 
three-tiered solution that involves congressional and CFPB action 
and discusses what would happen if Congress and the CFPB left the 
solution up to the courts.17 
                                                                                                                 
Supreme Court Justice, WASH. EXAMINER (June 12, 2017, 10:59 AM), 
http://www.washingtonexaminer.com/neil-gorsuch-writes-first-opinion-as-supreme-court-
justice/article/2625661 [https://perma.cc/CH8C-T9LT]. 
 10. Henson, 137 S. Ct. at 1721 (“[W]e begin, as we must, with a careful examination of the statutory 
text.”). 
 11. Id. 
 12. Matthew Rosenkoff, Game, Set, but Not Match: Supreme Court’s Decision in Henson v. 
Santander, 86 U.S.L.W. (BNA) 45, 48 (2017). 
 13. See discussion infra Part I.A–B. 
 14. See discussion infra Part I.C. 
 15. See discussion infra Part II. 
 16. See discussion infra Part II. 
 17. See discussion infra Part III. 
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I.   Background 
Congress enacted the FDCPA in 197718 in response to 
congressional research that found evidence of abusive, deceptive, and 
unfair debt collection practices.19 The Act’s main purposes are to (1) 
eliminate abusive debt collection, (2) protect ethical debt collectors 
from disadvantages, and (3) foster uniform consumer protection.20 
The Act has been criticized for its lack of clarity,21 and disputes over 
the intended scope of coverage for the FDCPA go back at least thirty 
years.22 
A.   Who Does the FDCPA Cover? 
The FDCPA is a broad statute,23 but in many respects it is also 
narrow.24 The Act only covers debt collectors who are collecting 
debts stemming from primarily personal consumer transactions.25 
Congress intended for the FDCPA to apply only to debt collectors—
as opposed to banks and other financial product lenders—due to the 
belief that financial product lenders were more likely to have 
repeated contact with a consumer.26 
                                                                                                                 
 18. Kaymark v. Bank of Am., N.A., 783 F.3d 168, 174 (3d Cir. 2015). 
 19. 15 U.S.C. § 1692(a)–(b), (e) (2012); Kaymark, 783 F.3d at 174. 
 20. Jolina Cuaresma, Katherine Lamberth & Brent Yarborough, Do You Think Banks Are Debt 
Collectors? The CFPB and the FTC Do, BUS. L. TODAY, Oct. 2016, at 1. 
 21. Carmen H. Thomas, Graham R. Billings & Donna O. Tillis, Defining “Debt Collector” Under 
the FDCPA: The Eleventh and Fourth Circuits Reject the Acquired-in-Default Test, 72 BUS. LAW. 487, 
487 (2017). 
 22. See, e.g., Kimber v. Fed. Fin. Corp., 668 F. Supp. 1480, 1484 (M.D. Ala. 1987). 
 23. Kaymark, 783 F.3d at 174 (“The Court has repeatedly held that ‘[a]s remedial legislation, the 
FDCPA must be broadly construed in order to give full effect to these purposes . . . .’”). 
 24. See Rosenkoff, supra note 12, at 46. 
 25. Id.; see also FTC, DEBT COLLECTION 1 (2015), https://www.consumer.ftc.gov/articles/pdf-0036-
debt-collection.pdf [https://perma.cc/9RDV-CHF5]. Even though the FDCPA does not cover debts 
incurred for business or commercial purposes, a consumer can still be liable in his individual capacity 
for business debts. Boosahda v. Providence Dane LLC, 462 F. App’x 331, 335 (4th Cir. 2012). 
 26. Cuaresma et al., supra note 20, at 1. Congress thought that debt collectors have little to no 
concern with a debtor’s perception of them because, often, debt collectors do not have contact with a 
debtor after receiving payment. Id. However, banks and consumer lenders are more likely to have future 
contact with consumers and therefore have an inherent reason not to engage in abusive behavior so that 
they can protect their good will. Id. 
4
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The FDCPA defines a debt collector as “any person who uses any 
instrumentality of interstate commerce or the mails in any business 
the principal purpose of which is the collection of any debts, or who 
regularly collects or attempts to collect, directly or indirectly, debts 
owed or due or asserted to be owed or due another.”27 Put another 
way, a debt collector is bound to the provisions of the FDCPA if its 
principal purpose of business is debt collection or if they regularly 
collect debts owed to another entity.28 
B.   The Consumer Financial Protection Bureau 
Before 2010, the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) served as the 
enforcing body of the FDCPA, and in many respects the Commission 
still has enforcement power.29 The Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform 
and Consumer Protection Act (Dodd-Frank), among other things, 
                                                                                                                 
 27. 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(6) (2012). The statute excludes from the definition: 
(A) any officer or employee of a creditor while, in the name of the creditor, 
collecting debts for such creditor; (B) any person while acting as a debt collector 
for another person, both of whom are related by common ownership or affiliated 
by corporate control, if the person acting as a debt collector does so only for 
persons to whom it is so related or affiliated and if the principal business of such 
person is not the collection of debts; (C) any officer or employee of the United 
States or any State to the extent that collecting or attempting to collect any debt 
is in the performance of his official duties; (D) any person while serving or 
attempting to serve legal process on any other person in connection with the 
judicial enforcement of any debt; (E) any nonprofit organization which, at the 
request of consumers, performs bona fide consumer credit counseling and assists 
consumers in the liquidation of their debts by receiving payments from such 
consumers and distributing such amounts to creditors; and (F) any person 
collecting or attempting to collect any debt owed or due or asserted to be owed 
or due another to the extent such activity (i) is incidental to a bona fide fiduciary 
obligation or a bona fide escrow arrangement; (ii) concerns a debt which was 
originated by such person; (iii) concerns a debt which was not in default at the 
time it was obtained by such person; or (iv) concerns a debt obtained by such 
person as a secured party in a commercial credit transaction involving the 
creditor. 
Id. § 1692a(6)(A)–(F). 
 28. Thomas et al., supra note 21, at 487–88. 
 29. 15 U.S.C. § 1692l(a) (2012) (“The Federal Trade Commission shall be authorized to enforce 
compliance with this subchapter, except to the extent that enforcement of the requirements imposed 
under this subchapter is specifically committed to another Government agency . . . .”). Generally, the 
FTC seeks to prevent persons and businesses, with some statutory exceptions, from engaging in unfair 
competition and unfair or deceptive acts or practices that affect interstate commerce. Id. § 45(a)(2). 
5
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created the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB) as part of 
the sweeping financial reforms in the wake of the 2008 financial 
crisis.30 Dodd-Frank amended the FDCPA to add the Bureau to the 
list of agencies with the power to enforce the Act.31 The CFPB 
oversees federal laws that protect financial-products consumers from 
unfair, abusive, and deceptive acts or practices.32 It is the only 
consumer-focused regulatory agency, consolidating the shared power 
of several agencies within the federal government.33 The CFPB and 
the FTC share enforcement authority of the FDCPA,34 but from a 
practical standpoint the CFPB assumes a large role over enforcing the 
FDCPA and other debt collection laws.35 Since Congress established 
the CFPB six years ago, the agency has enjoyed success in its 
consumer protection goals, returning billions of dollars to consumers 
through enforcement actions.36 However, the Supreme Court dealt a 
                                                                                                                 
 30. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 1011, 
124 Stat. 1376, 1964 (2010) (codified as 12 U.S.C. § 5491 (2012)). 
 31. Id. § 1089, 124 Stat. 1376, 2092 (codified as amended as 15 U.S.C. § 1692l (2012)) (“The Fair 
Debt Collection Practices Act (15 U.S.C. 1692 et seq.) is amended . . . by striking ‘Commission’ each 
place that the term appears and inserting ‘Bureau’ . . . . The term ‘Bureau’ means the Bureau of 
Consumer Financial Protection.”). Until Dodd-Frank created the CFPB, no agency had the authority to 
issue regulations with respect to the FDCPA. CFPB, SMALL BUSINESS REVIEW PANEL FOR DEBT 
COLLECTOR AND DEBT BUYER RULEMAKING: OUTLINE OF PROPOSALS UNDER CONSIDERATION AND 
ALTERNATIVES CONSIDERED 2 (2016), 
http://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/documents/20160727_cfpb_Outline_of_proposals.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/YR7H-TZL3]. 
 32. 12 U.S.C. § 5531(a) (2012). 
 33. Megan Slack, Consumer Financial Protection Bureau 101: Why We Need a Consumer 
Watchdog, OBAMA WHITE HOUSE: BLOG (Jan. 4, 2012, 11:13 AM), 
https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/blog/2012/01/04/consumer-financial-protection-bureau-101-why-
we-need-consumer-watchdog#What is CFPB [https://perma.cc/54S5-RYAR]. Before the CFPB, the 
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, the Federal Trade Commission, the National Credit Union 
Administration, the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, the Office of Thrift Supervision, and the 
Department of Housing and Urban Development shared consumer financial protection responsibilities. 
Matt Gunn, What’s Getting Consolidated Under the CFPB?, BANK SYS. & TECH. (Mar. 23, 2011, 12:25 
PM), http://www.banktech.com/compliance/whats-getting-consolidated-under-the-cfpb/d/d-
id/1294592.html [ https://perma.cc/T6ZW-CG4J]. 
 34. See generally CFPB 2017, supra note 2, at 8 (“The CFPB and the FTC work closely to 
coordinate debt collection enforcement actions among other matters related to debt collection.”). From a 
practical standpoint, the CFPB assumes a large role over enforcing the FDCPA and other debt collection 
laws. 
 35. Evan Dix, Dazed and Confused: The Need for Clarity in Dodd-Frank’s Abusive Standard, 47 
STETSON L. REV. 185, 211 (2017). 
 36. C. Ryan Barber, The CFPB, Often a Winner in Court, Hit a Rough Patch this Summer, NAT’L 
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significant blow to the regulatory agency when it announced that debt 
purchasers do not qualify as debt collectors under the FDCPA.37 The 
decision severely limits the reach of the FDCPA and, given the recent 
uncertainty surrounding the CFPB, creates new questions about the 
CFPB’s future role in enforcing consumer protection laws.38 
C.   Henson v. Santander Consumer USA, Inc. 
Prior to Henson v. Santander, most courts that addressed the 
default status of an acquired debt held that the terms “creditor” and 
“debt collector” were mutually exclusive, meaning that an entity can 
                                                                                                                 
L.J. (Sept. 19, 2017, 2:13 PM), http://www.nationallawjournal.com/id=1202798320034 
[https://perma.cc/U5E5-Q6P7]; Standing up for You, CFPB, https://www.consumerfinance.gov/ 
[https://perma.cc/K8DD-MHMT] (last updated June 4, 2018) (claiming to hold companies accountable 
for “$12.4 billion in relief to consumers through [CFPB’s] enforcement actions”). These enforcement 
actions include filing actions in federal district court and initiating administrative adjudication 
proceedings. Enforcement Actions, CFPB, https://www.consumerfinance.gov/policy-
compliance/enforcement/actions/ [https://perma.cc/U8S9-AGA7] (last visited Oct. 16, 2018). The CFPB 
uses these tactics to effectuate its goals of making consumer finance rules more effective, consistently 
enforcing those rules, and empowering consumers to take more control over their economic lives. 
Strategy, Budget and Performance, CFPB, https://www.consumerfinance.gov/about-us/budget-strategy/ 
[https://perma.cc/9WT8-RQ25] (last visited Oct. 16, 2018). 
 37. Henson v. Santander Consumer USA, Inc., 137 S. Ct. 1718, 1721–22 (2017). 
 38. E.g., C. Ryan Barber, CFPB Lawyers: Trumped?, NAT’L L.J., Feb. 27, 2017, at 6. Barber’s 
article quotes one lawyer who, in court, recently referred to the CFPB as the “‘800-pound gorilla in the 
regulatory room.’” Id. In addition, Republican nominee Donald Trump vowed to dismantle the CFPB as 
part of his campaign platform. Id. His transition team reaffirmed this position after the election, stating 
Trump’s belief that the agency’s mandates “‘do[] not work for working people.’” C. Ryan Barber, 
Trump Aims at Dodd-Frank, NAT’L L.J., Nov. 14, 2016, at 6. The distaste toward the CFPB gained 
support in the courts in October 2016 when the United States Court of Appeals for the District of 
Columbia Circuit ruled that the President should be able to remove the CFPB’s Director, reasoning that 
the agency’s structure was unconstitutional. PHH Corp. v. CFPB, 839 F.3d 1, 8, 37 (D.C. Cir. 2016), 
reh’g en banc granted, vacated (Feb. 16, 2017) (explaining that an independent agency headed by a 
single director who is removable by the President only for cause violated Article II of the Constitution); 
C. Ryan Barber, Riders on the CFPB Storm, NAT’L L.J., Jan. 9, 2017, at 1 [hereinafter Barber, Riders on 
the CFPB Storm]. The D.C. Circuit’s ruling caused several companies, seeking to escape the agency’s 
grasp, to cite the opinion in court. Barber, Riders on the CFPB Storm, supra, at 1. The CFPB’s structure 
is not the only constitutional challenge to the agency. See William Simpson, Above Reproach: How the 
Consumer Financial Protection Bureau Escapes Constitutional Checks & Balances, 36 REV. BANKING 
& FIN. L. 343, 353 (2016). The agency’s budget comes directly from the Federal Reserve, not the 
Appropriations Committee, making the agency’s budget exempt from Congressional review. Id. at 345, 
353. In Atlanta, District Judge Richard Story sanctioned the CFPB in August 2017 because he felt the 
agency showed disregard for judicial instructions during the discovery process. R. Robin McDonald, 
Judge Sanctions Federal Consumer Bureau in Collections Case, DAILY REPORT, Aug. 30, 2017, at 1. 
The dismissal came after Judge Story issued an injunction earlier in 2015 that froze the assets of the 
individual defendants and their business operations. Id. 
7
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be either a creditor or debt collector under the statute, but not both.39 
Determination of an entity’s status depended on the status of the debt 
sought for collection: If the debt was in default, the entity was a debt 
collector, and if the debt was not in default, the entity was a 
creditor.40 The distinction between creditor and debt collector is 
important because creditors are not liable for the actions of third-
party debt collectors under the FDCPA.41 But a debt collector can be 
vicariously liable for the actions of those seeking to collect a debt on 
its behalf.42 Following the lead of the Eleventh Circuit in Davidson v. 
Capital One Bank (USA), N.A., the Fourth Circuit departed from this 
dichotomous school of thought and laid the foundation for the 
Supreme Court’s review of the newly-created circuit split.43 
The facts setting the stage for Henson v. Santander are not unique: 
Four Maryland consumers each signed a retail sales contract with 
CitiFinancial Auto (CitiFinancial) to finance an automobile 
purchase.44 When the plaintiffs stopped making payments and 
defaulted on the contract, CitiFinancial repossessed the cars and 
informed each plaintiff of its intention to pursue a deficiency 
judgment.45 CitiFinancial later sold the plaintiffs’ defaulted debts as 
part of a large debt portfolio to Santander Consumer USA 
(Santander).46 After Santander began contacting the plaintiffs in an 
                                                                                                                 
 39. Thomas et al., supra note 21, at 488. The FDCPA defines a creditor as “any person who offers or 
extends credit creating a debt or to whom a debt is owed.” 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(4) (2012). The term does 
not include “any person to the extent that he receives an assignment or transfer of a debt in default 
solely for the purpose of facilitating collection of such debt for another.” Id. 
 40. Thomas et al., supra note 21, at 488. 
 41. Rosenkoff, supra note 12, at 46; see also Henson v. Santander Consumer USA, Inc., 817 F.3d 
131, 136–37 (4th Cir. 2016), cert. granted, 137 S. Ct. 810 (2017), aff’d, 137 S. Ct. 1718 (2017). 
 42. Rosenkoff, supra note 12, at 46. 
 43. Henson, 817 F.3d at 135–36 (explaining that the FDCPA “purports to regulate only the conduct 
of debt collectors, not creditors,” and debt collectors collect debt on behalf of a creditor, whereas 
creditors are those to which a debt is owed, so when a creditor seeks to collect its own debts, it is not 
acting as a debt collector); Davidson v. Capital One Bank (USA), N.A., 797 F.3d 1309, 1316 (11th Cir. 
2015). With their decisions, the Fourth and Eleventh Circuits split from rulings in the Third, Sixth, and 
Seventh Circuits, which previously adopted the “mutually exclusive” approach. Cuaresma et al., supra 
note 20, at 3. 
 44. Henson, 817 F.3d at 134. 
 45. Id. 
 46. Id. 
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effort to collect on the debts, the plaintiffs filed an action alleging 
that Santander violated the FDCPA in both the pursuit of the 
collection and the manner of pursuit.47 The Fourth Circuit Court of 
Appeals concluded that the defaulted status of a debt “has no bearing 
on whether a person qualifies as a debt collector under the threshold 
definition set forth in [the statute].”48 
On appeal, the Supreme Court sought to answer whether the 
FDCPA treats a debt purchaser in this kind of scenario “more like the 
repo man or the loan originator.”49 Ultimately, the Supreme Court 
found the Fourth Circuit’s reasoning compelling and held that 
purchasers of defaulted debt do not trigger the statutory definition of 
a debt collector when they collect debts for themselves,50 focusing 
the majority of its time on a grammatical analysis of the word 
“another.”51 
One thing is for certain following Henson v. Santander: consumers 
and their attorneys can no longer assert that a debt purchaser is a debt 
collector subject to the FDCPA simply by showing that the debt was 
in default at the time of acquisition.52 However, it remains to be seen 
whether a debt purchaser of defaulted accounts can be, and will be, 
classified as a debt collector through a different manner.53 After all, 
the Supreme Court explicitly stated that it was not addressing the 
                                                                                                                 
 47. Id. In order to meet FDCPA requirements that a plaintiff properly allege that the defendant is a 
debt collector, the Henson plaintiffs alleged that Santander purchases defaulted consumer debts for 
pennies on the dollar as part of its business. Id. The plaintiffs argued further: 
The terms “debt collector” and “creditor” are mutually exclusive under the 
FDCPA. An entity can be either a “debt collector” or a “creditor” in any 
particular transaction. The determining factor of whether an entity is a “debt 
collector” or “creditor” in any particular transaction when the entity in question 
is not the originating lender is whether the debt was acquired prior to default or 
after default. Since Santander acquired [the plaintiffs’] debts from the original 
lender well after each [plaintiff] defaulted on their debt, Santander’s collection 
activities on these defaulted debts make[] it a “debt collector.” 
Id. at 135. 
 48. Henson, 817 F.3d at 135. 
 49. Henson v. Santander Consumer USA, Inc., 137 S. Ct. 1718, 1721 (2017). 
 50. Id. at 1721–22. 
 51. Rosenkoff, supra note 12, at 47. 
 52. Id. 
 53. Id. 
9
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meaning and application of the other definition of debt collector that 
focuses on the principal business purpose.54 Although the Supreme 
Court focused almost entirely on a grammatical analysis of 
“another,” a distinction or restriction does not exist for the principal 
purpose definition.55 Moreover, much of the FDCPA litigation has 
not focused on the principal business purpose prong, making 
potential arguments harder for consumer attorneys.56 The Supreme 
Court does not seem likely to address the principal business purpose 
argument any time soon, if ever.57 Questions about an institution like 
Santander claiming its primary business purpose to be loan 
origination, and not the purchase of defaulted debt, surely exist, but 
the Court did not provide definite answers to those questions or any 
related ones.58 Although the Court applauded both sides for 
presenting strong arguments on the questions not litigated, it believed 
that the existence of the arguments suggests one likely consequence: 
the matters not addressed in the opinion are matters for Congress to 
resolve, not the Supreme Court.59 This does not mean that lower 
courts will avoid the question; at least one court has held that the 
presence of the definite article “the” indicates that Congress intended 
for a business to have only one principal (or primary) purpose.60 Just 
                                                                                                                 
 54. Henson, 137 S. Ct. at 1721. Although the court acknowledged the principal purpose prong of the 
statutory definitions, it explained: 
[T]he parties briefly allude to another statutory definition of the term “debt 
collector”–one that encompasses those engaged “in any business the principal 
purpose of which is the collection of any debts.” § 1692a(6). But the parties 
haven’t much litigated that alternative definition and in granting certiorari we 
didn’t agree to address it either. 
Id. 
 55. Rosenkoff, supra note 12, at 48. 
 56. Id. 
 57. See Henson, 137 S. Ct. at 1725. 
 58. Id. 
 59. Id. This, obviously, is not set in stone. With the Senate confirming Justice Kavanaugh to the 
Court and two sitting Justices at least eighty years old, the Supreme Court could drastically change in a 
relatively short amount of time. Newly-confirmed Justice Kavanaugh wrote a lengthy dissent in the 
rehearing of PHH v. CFPB in which he argued that the CFPB is unconstitutional because it is the only 
independent agency whose “head” is not accountable to a commission or board. PHH Corp. v. 
Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau, 881 F.3d 75, 165 (D.C. Cir. 2018) (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting). 
 60. Hunte v. Safeguard Props. Mgmt., LLC, 25 F. Supp. 3d 722, 726 (N.D. Ill. 2017) (“The pertinent 
portion of § 1692a(6) defines ‘debt collector’ as an entity ‘the principal purpose of which is the 
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as Henson v. Santander definitively answered the question of the 
status of a purchaser of defaulted debts, it posed an equally important 
question about a debt purchaser’s principal business purpose.61 
II.   Analysis 
Henson v. Santander created a near-ironclad defense for debt 
purchasers named in FDCPA lawsuits.62 Among other requirements, 
a plaintiff’s FDCPA claim must contain enough facts to establish that 
the defendant attempting to collect the debt meets the statutory 
definition of a debt collector.63 Even if a defendant qualified as a debt 
collector under the statute, it could succeed on a motion to dismiss if 
the plaintiff’s complaint did not properly allege that the defendant 
was a debt collector.64 Henson v. Santander makes it probable that a 
debt purchaser will successfully move to dismiss FDCPA claims 
filed against it simply by citing Henson v. Santander even if the debt 
purchaser engaged in egregious misconduct, and the complaint 
properly alleges that the defendant has violated the Act and made the 
plaintiff the object of collection activity. Although Henson v. 
Santander provided debt purchasers with a new argument in a motion 
to dismiss, the debt purchasers face another challenge: how will 
courts address and resolve the assertion that a debt purchaser’s 
principal business purpose is the collection of debt?65 Further, 
debtor-plaintiffs could face additional hurdles in the courts. 
                                                                                                                 
enforcement of security interests.’ 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(6) (emphasis added). Not ‘a principal purpose of 
which,’ but ‘the principal purpose of which.’”). 
 61. Rosenkoff, supra note 12, at 48. 
 62. See id. 
 63. Frazier v. Absolute Collection Serv., Inc., 767 F. Supp. 2d 1354, 1363 (N.D. Ga. 2011). A 
plaintiff must also establish that: (1) “she has been the object of collection activity arising from a 
consumer debt;” and (2) “the defendant has engaged in a prohibited act or has failed to perform a 
requirement imposed by the FDCPA.” Id. 
 64. E.g., Ramsay v. Sawyer Prop. Mgmt., LLC, 948 F. Supp. 2d 525, 531, 537 (D. Md. 2013) 
(granting defendants’ motions to dismiss because plaintiff’s complaint did not demonstrate that 
defendants were debt collectors). 
 65. Rosenkoff, supra note 12, at 48. 
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A.   The Principal Purpose Prong 
Before Henson v. Santander, a company could acquire defaulted 
debts while having a principal business purpose of collecting those 
debts and, technically, fall into the FDCPA’s creditor and debt 
collector classifications at the same time.66 The Supreme Court stated 
that the status of the debt is irrelevant because the only inquiry that 
matters is whether the debt owner “seeks to collect debts for its own 
account or does so for ‘another.’”67 With the new standard, it does 
not matter how the debt owner became the debt owner—whether 
through origination or subsequent purchase.68 
1.   A New Kind of Mutual Exclusivity 
At least for the “owed . . . another” prong, Henson v. Santander 
renders the previous circuit split about mutual exclusivity for the 
acquisition of defaulted debt irrelevant. However, in jurisdictions that 
previously used the mutual exclusivity approach, Henson v. 
Santander may have a more severe impact on debt collection than in 
jurisdictions that held the determination of creditor versus debt 
collector is not mutually exclusive. In jurisdictions that applied 
mutual exclusivity, a strong argument exists that Henson v. 
Santander eliminates the principal business purpose argument.69 As 
explained earlier, in those jurisdictions an entity is either a creditor or 
a debt collector.70 Because Henson v. Santander classifies debt 
purchasers collecting their own debts as creditors, the mutual 
exclusivity approach would permanently classify these entities as 
creditors as long as the debt subject to dispute or litigation is one that 
the entity purchased for itself. The Court seems to adopt its own 
version of mutual exclusivity with respect to the collection efforts for 
                                                                                                                 
 66. Cuaresma et al., supra note 20, at 2. 
 67. Henson v. Santander Consumer USA, Inc., 137 S. Ct. 1718, 1721 (2017). 
 68. Id. 
 69. Rosenkoff, supra note 12, at 48. 
 70. Thomas et al., supra note 21, at 488. The CFPB and the FTC have also adopted the mutually 
exclusive approach. Cuaresma et al., supra note 20, at 2. 
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a single debt—the company either collects a debt owed to itself or 
collects a debt owed to someone else.71 
2.   Problems with Asserting a Principal Purpose Argument 
Historically, it has been easier for consumer attorneys to prove the 
defaulted status of a debt rather than the principal business purpose 
of the debt collector.72 Now that the status of the debt essentially 
does not matter, attorneys will have to present the principal purpose 
argument in FDCPA lawsuits against debt purchasers, but it is not 
clear how courts will address these arguments. Plaintiffs usually lack 
sufficient information about a debt collector to assert enough facts to 
prove an entity’s principal purpose is debt collection.73 This results in 
conclusory statements and “threadbare allegations” that modern 
courts do not accept.74 
Some of the nation’s largest debt purchasers, seemingly, are at 
least cognizant of the problems plaintiffs run into when attempting to 
assert a principal purpose argument.75 Encore Capital Group (Encore) 
is the nation’s largest debt buyer.76 The company’s “About Encore” 
                                                                                                                 
 71. Henson, 137 S. Ct. at 1724. The Court explained that under the FDCPA, as written, an entity has 
to attempt to collect a debt owed to another entity before the collecting entity can even qualify as a debt 
collector. Id.; see also 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(6) (2012). The presence of the conjunction “or” makes quite a 
difference for interpreting the definition of a debt collector because, naturally, it means that an entity 
cannot fall into more than one statutory definition. Rosenkoff, supra note 12, at 47. Additionally, the 
Court points out that in other parts of the FDCPA’s definition section, Congress used “or” when it 
wished to differentiate between originators of credit and purchasers of debt. Henson, 137 S. Ct. at 1723. 
Specifically, the statute differentiates between debts “originated by” a debt collector and debts owed to 
someone else. 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(6)(F)(iii) (2012); Henson, 137 S. Ct. at 1723. The Court could not 
ignore these distinctions, pointing out that when one engages in statutory interpretation, there is a strong 
presumption that differences in language like the ones discussed above tend to convey differences in 
meaning. Henson, 137 S. Ct. at 1723. 
 72. Rosenkoff, supra note 12, at 48. 
 73. E.g., Ramsay v. Sawyer Prop. Mgmt., LLC, 948 F. Supp. 2d 525, 532 (D. Md. 2013) 
(“Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint falls short of alleging that debt collection is the primary purpose of 
[the defendant’s] business.”). 
 74. Id. 
 75. About Cavalry, CAVALRY PORTFOLIO SERVS., http://www.cavalryportfolioservices.com/about 
[https://perma.cc/FMB3-EEA8] (last visited Oct. 16, 2018); Our Mission, ENCORE CAPITAL GRP., 
https://www.encorecapital.com/about/our-mission [https://perma.cc/DY7D-4VT3] (last visited Oct. 16, 
2018); Who is MCM?, MIDLAND CREDIT MGMT., INC., https://www.midlandcreditonline.com/who-is-
mcm/midland-funding-llc/ [https://perma.cc/8NTM-L2D4] (last visited Oct. 16, 2018). 
 76. CFPB Takes Action Against the Two Largest Debt Buyers for Using Deceptive Tactics to Collect 
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page on its website indicates that its subsidiaries “purchase portfolios 
of consumer receivables from major banks, credit unions, utility 
providers, and municipalities[] and partner with individuals as they 
repay their obligations and work toward financial recovery.”77 The 
statement indicates that Encore’s principal business purpose is debt 
collection, but the company’s mission statement creates some 
ambiguity.78 Encore states that its mission is to “help people recover 
from financial difficulty and turn toward a path of economic 
empowerment.”79 The conflicting statements on Encore’s website 
represent conflicting facts for attorneys seeking to make the principal 
business purpose argument. 
A consumer attorney would likely read the mission statement to 
mean that Encore’s principal business purpose is debt collection, but 
Encore would likely insist that its principal business purpose is to 
provide financial recovery assistance.80 An inquiry into one of 
Encore’s largest subsidiaries, Midland Credit Management, yields 
similar results. Midland Credit states that it “is dedicated to helping 
consumers find their way back to financial stability and relieve the 
emotional stress that can accompany unpaid debt.”81 The debate 
                                                                                                                 
Bad Debts, CFPB (Sept. 9, 2015), https://www.consumerfinance.gov/about-us/newsroom/cfpb-takes-
action-against-the-two-largest-debt-buyers-for-using-deceptive-tactics-to-collect-bad-debts/ 
[https://perma.cc/3LN8-GWSP]. In its suit against Encore Capital Group, the CFPB alleged that the 
company purchased debts without confirming their validity and pressured consumers into payments. 
Yuka Hayashi, CFPB Settles with Debt-Collection Giants, WALL ST. J. (Sept. 9, 2015, 4:14 PM), 
https://www.wsj.com/articles/cfpb-settles-with-debt-collection-giants-1441829640 
[https://perma.cc/JAL4-SLBA]. Encore and the CFPB reached an agreement in which the company 
agreed to pay a $10 million fine and repay $42 million to consumers. Id. 
 77. About Encore, ENCORE CAPITAL GRP., https://www.encorecapital.com/about 
[https://perma.cc/9XQY-ASPX] (last visited Oct. 16, 2018). Although it does not seem like an important 
distinction, it is interesting to note that Encore Capital Group states that “[its] subsidiaries,” not Encore 
itself, purchase consumer debt. Id. 
 78. Id.; ENCORE CAPITAL GRP., supra note 75. The ambiguity exists in trying to decipher the 
conflicting statements that indicate Encore’s principal business purpose is debt collection while 
simultaneously identifying its goal (e.g., its business purpose) is to help consumers recover from 
financial hardship. ENCORE CAPITAL GRP., supra note 75. 
 79. ENCORE CAPITAL GRP., supra note 75. 
 80. Id. 
 81. MIDLAND CREDIT MGMT., supra note 75. Language like this appears to be the industry standard. 
See id.; CAVALRY PORTFOLIO SERVS., supra note 75. Cavalry Portfolio Services, another of the nation’s 
largest debt purchasers, describes its “commitment to resolving each customer’s financial situation” and 
ability to “work with customers to identify solutions that improve their financial fitness.” CAVALRY 
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about a debt buyer’s principal business purpose could focus on 
mission statements and pledges found on a company’s website. 
However, the more pressing issue for consumers is whether courts 
will accept these statements as sufficient proof of the company’s 
principal business purpose being the collection of debt.82 Federal 
courts have dismissed FDCPA claims in the past when the plaintiff 
made conclusory allegations about the nature of a debt collector’s 
business.83 It remains to be seen how a court will characterize 
statements like those described above in an assertion about a 
defendant’s principal business purpose; it also remains to be seen 
whether a court will afford deference to those statements.84 
B.   Debt Purchasers Are Not Completely Out of the Woods 
The Supreme Court concluded that a debt purchaser collecting its 
own debts is more akin to a creditor, exempting it from the FDCPA.85 
However, exemption from FDCPA liability does not give debt 
purchasers “carte blanche” to engage in whatever conduct they 
choose, nor does it preclude them from facing liability for 
misconduct stemming from other laws.86 Laws exist in all fifty states 
that provide protection for consumers by prohibiting unfair, 
deceptive, and abusive acts and practices (commonly called UDAP 
statutes).87 However, a glaring lack of uniformity exists among these 
                                                                                                                 
PORTFOLIO SERVS., supra note 75. 
 82. E.g., Ramsay v. Sawyer Prop. Mgmt., 948 F. Supp. 2d 525, 530 (D. Md. 2013) (reasoning that 
the plaintiff failed to show that the defendant regularly collected debts on behalf of another entity 
because the complaint only contained a conclusion that the defendant collected such debts and did not 
include sufficient evidence to support the claim). 
 83. Id. 
 84. Id. at 532 (citing Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009)). 
 85. Henson v. Santander Consumer USA, Inc., 137 S. Ct. 1718, 1721 (2017). A creditor becomes 
subject to the FDCPA as a debt collector only if, “in the process of collecting [its] own debts,” it “uses 
any name other than [its] own which would indicate that a third person is collecting or attempting to 
collect such debts.” 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(6) (2012). 
 86. The FDCPA is not the only law that applies to financial misconduct. See 12 
U.S.C. § 5563(a)(1)(B) (2012). The Dodd-Frank Act prohibits any unfair, deceptive, or abusive act or 
practice. Id. The CFPB may act to enforce this statute, but the statute does not create a private right of 
action. Beider v. Retrieval Masters Creditors Bureau, Inc., 146 F. Supp. 3d 465, 472 (E.D.N.Y. 2015). 
 87. CAROLYN L. CARTER, NAT’L CONSUMER L. CTR., CONSUMER PROTECTION IN THE UNITED 
STATES: A 50-STATE REPORT ON UNFAIR AND DECEPTIVE ACTS AND PRACTICES STATUTES 5 (Feb. 
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state laws.88 On one hand, some laws, like California’s Rosenthal 
Act, “mimic[] or incorporate[] by reference the FDCPA’s 
requirements,” including available remedies for misconduct.89 On the 
other hand, some laws, like Georgia’s Industrial Loan Act, only 
apply to entities that provide loans less than $3,000.90 State-level 
consumer protection laws can be effective, but the inconsistencies 
from state to state, when coupled with the limits placed on federal 
law by Henson v. Santander, have the potential to limit a consumer’s 
available remedies just by virtue of the state he lives in. 
1.   Vicarious Liability 
The requisite for imposing vicarious liability under the FDCPA 
also hinges on whether an entity is a debt collector or a creditor.91 For 
the most part, when a company qualifies as a debt collector under the 
FDCPA, courts have found the company liable for FDCPA violations 
committed by its third-party attorneys.92 However, when the 
                                                                                                                 
2009), https://www.nclc.org/images/pdf/car_sales/UDAP_Report_Feb09.pdf [https://perma.cc/Z6XD-
F9N2]. Although Carter published this source in 2009, before the passage of The Dodd-Frank Act and 
the creation of the CFPB, the FDCPA had been in effect for over thirty years. See S. REP. NO. 95-382, at 
1 (1977), as reprinted in 1977 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1695, 1695. 
 88. See CARTER, supra note 87, at 5. As of 2009, the states varied greatly in the scope of UDAP 
statutes. See id. at 7–10. Some states, like Rhode Island, had statutes that provided strong consumer 
protection for post-sales acts but provided weak protection for credit, insurance, utilities, and real estate, 
whereas other states, like Nevada, had statutes that provided strong protection in each of these types of 
transactions. Id. at 9. 
 89. Riggs v. Prober & Raphael, 681 F.3d 1097, 1100 (9th Cir. 2012). The Rosenthal Act provides 
that all debt collectors must comply with Sections 1692b through 1692j of the FDCPA and states further 
that debt collectors are subject to the remedies found in Section 1692k of the FDCPA. CAL. CIV. 
CODE § 1788.17 (West 2017). There are even more inconsistencies, however, as the Rosenthal Act 
references the incorporated federal sections “as they read” on January 1, 2001. Id. A 2006 amendment to 
the FDCPA states that “[a] communication in the form of a formal pleading in a civil action shall not be 
treated as an initial communication” for the purposes of triggering certain action upon a debt collector’s 
initial communication with a debtor. 15 U.S.C. § 1692g(d) (2012). This inconsistency is beyond the 
scope of this Note, but it illustrates another issue with debt collection. 
 90. O.C.G.A. § 7-3-4 (2015). 
 91. See Jerman v. Carlisle, McNellie, Rini, Kramer & Ulrich LPA, 559 U.S. 573, 600 (2010) (stating 
that some courts have held clients vicariously liable for their lawyer’s violations of the FDCPA). 
 92. E.g., Polanco v. NCO Portfolio Mgmt., Inc., 132 F. Supp. 3d 567, 584–85 (S.D.N.Y. 2015). 
Courts have previously held that principals or corporate parents can be vicariously liable for their 
agents’ or subsidiaries’ FDCPA violations when the principals are themselves debt collectors. Id. 
Conversely, attorneys are generally not vicariously liable for the misconduct of their debt collector-
clients. Clark v. Capital Credit & Collection Servs., Inc., 460 F.3d 1162, 1173 (9th Cir. 2006). 
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company is not a debt collector under the FDCPA, some courts have 
refused to impose vicarious liability for the actions of its attorneys.93 
The United States District Court for the District of Maryland 
provided the rationale for this theory: 
A debt collector should not be able to hire an attorney to 
engage in illegal debt collection practices on its behalf as a 
means of avoiding liability under the FDCPA. On the other 
hand, if the client is not a debt collector subject to liability 
under the FDCPA itself, then its decision to hire an 
attorney to engage in debt collection practices on its behalf 
would not be predicated on evading FDCPA liability, and 
imputing liability under those circumstances would not 
further the interests of the Act.94 
The disagreements between courts about when a debt collector or 
creditor should be vicariously liable for its agent’s FDCPA violations 
could gain more traction soon.95 Not only are circuit courts split on 
the appropriate test, but certain district courts within some circuits do 
not agree on how to determine vicarious liability under the FDCPA.96 
Given the restrictions that Henson v. Santander imposed on a 
consumer’s ability to seek redress, vicarious liability is just one 
                                                                                                                 
 93. Wadlington v. Credit Acceptance Corp., 76 F.3d 103, 108 (6th Cir. 1996). But see Huy Thanh 
Vo v. Nelson & Kennard, 931 F. Supp. 2d 1080, 1090 (E.D. Cal. 2013) (citing 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(6)) 
(holding that, even though subjecting creditors to vicarious liability will extend the FDCPA’s coverage 
to “non-’debt collectors,’” doing so creates necessary “incentives for creditors to monitor their 
attorneys’ compliance with fair debt collection laws” because attorneys acting as the creditor’s agent 
“allow[s] the creditor to say, ‘I didn’t do it; my attorney did it,’” thus allowing “the creditor to collect 
under ‘a name other than his own which would indicate that a third person is collecting or attempting to 
collect such debts’”). 
 94. Ramsay v. Sawyer Prop. Mgmt., LLC, 948 F. Supp. 2d 525, 533 (D. Md. 2013). 
 95. Compare Polanco, 132 F. Supp. 3d at 584 (concluding that, in accordance with the findings of 
other courts in that circuit, “principals or corporate parents may be held vicariously liable for their 
agents’ or subsidiaries’ actions that violated the FDCPA where the principals are themselves ‘debt 
collectors’”), with Wadlington, 76 F.3d at 108 (“We do not think it would accord with the intent of 
Congress . . . for a company that is not a debt collector to be held vicariously liable for a collection suit 
that violates [the FDCPA] only because the filing attorney is a ‘debt collector.’”). 
 96. Polanco, 132 F. Supp. 3d at 585. 
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theory of liability that courts may start to use to hold debt buyers 
accountable for their actions. 
2.   The Uncertain Future of the CFPB 
Growing opposition to the CFPB poses perhaps the greatest threat 
to consumer protection on a federal level.97 As the FDCPA is 
currently written, the FTC has the authority to enforce compliance 
with the Act, but it does not have rulemaking authority.98 The CFPB 
is the only government agency that has the authority to create rules 
and regulations for debt collectors and the debt collection industry.99 
If the CFPB is eventually ruled unconstitutional, the FTC would be 
severely limited in its ability to enforce compliance with the FDCPA 
because it would not have the authority to create new financial 
protection rules that regulate creditor-debt buyers.100 In July 2016, 
before Henson v. Santander reached the Supreme Court, the CFPB 
released an Outline of Proposals Under Consideration and 
                                                                                                                 
 97. See Barber, supra note 36. In addition to federal judges cracking down on the CFPB by 
dismissing its claims and awarding significantly less damages, the agency also lost one of its longest-
standing advocates in the United States Justice Department when he withdrew from all of the CFPB 
enforcement cases assigned to him. C. Ryan Barber, The CFPB Is Losing a Trial Court Ally in the U.S. 
Justice Department, NAT’L L.J. (Aug. 9, 2017), https://www.law.com/sites/almstaff/2017/08/09/the-
cfpb-is-losing-a-trial-court-ally-in-the-us-justice-department/ [https://perma.cc/4GF8-XXQ2] .   
 98. 15 U.S.C. § 1692l(a) (2012). 
 99. Id. § 1692l(d). 
 100. Id. § 1692l(a). The main constitutional challenge to the CFPB is its structure as an independent 
agency headed by a single director, rather than a multi-member board, who is removable by the 
President only for good cause. Neil J. Kinkopf, Alternative Facts & History, and Alarming Implications, 
in DOJ’s CFPB Brief, TAKE CARE BLOG (Apr. 17, 2017), https://takecareblog.com/blog/alternative-
facts-and-history-and-alarming-implications-in-doj-s-cfpb-brief [https://perma.cc/2ZNX-XSN7]. The 
House of Representatives passed a bill, the CHOICE Act, that would replace the CFPB’s single director 
with a bipartisan five-member commission that would subject the agency to congressional funding and 
oversight. Megan Leonhardt, Buried in Trump’s Budget: A New Attempt to Kill a Powerful Consumer 
Watchdog, TIME (May 23, 2017), http://time.com/money/4790486/trump-budget-2018-cuts-cfpb-
consumers/ [https://perma.cc/XYD6-YRHP]. The House of Representatives passed the CHOICE Act by 
a 233–186 vote. Donna Borak, House Votes to Kill Dodd-Frank. Now What?, CNN MONEY (June 8, 
2017, 6:11 PM), https://money.cnn.com/2017/06/08/news/economy/house-dodd-frank-repeal/index.html 
[https://perma.cc/8E6J-5544]. As of December 15, 2017, there was no reported action on the bill since 
July 13, 2017, when the Senate Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs held a hearing on 
the bill. See Financial CHOICE Act of 2017: Hearing on H.R. 10 Before the Comm. on Banking, Hous., 
& Urban Affairs, 115th Cong. (2017). 
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Alternatives Considered (Outline).101 Pursuant to its rulemaking 
authority, the CFPB released the outline as a response to 
contradictory court decisions in various jurisdictions that have 
resulted in different interpretations of the FDCPA.102 The CFPB 
realized the significance of the Fourth Circuit’s ruling and announced 
that it would consider using its rulemaking authority to issue rules 
that “regulate unfair, deceptive, and abusive acts and practices” 
engaged in by not only debt collectors but also entities that fall 
outside the FDCPA’s reach.103 
The CFPB’s proposals would apply to collection agencies, debt 
purchasers, debt collection law firms, and loan servicers.104 However, 
many, if not all, of the proposals considered would require the debt 
collector to take more steps in verifying the validity of the 
information it receives from the debt owner.105 The CFPB asserts that 
the proposed changes stem from its belief that debt collectors conduct 
only a limited review of the information received from the debt 
owner before starting collection activity.106 It is entirely possible, 
however, that some within the CFPB saw internal confusion and 
chaos, and feared that its ability to reach debt owners might expire.107 
                                                                                                                 
 101. Thomas et al., supra note 21, at 493. 
 102. CFPB, supra note 31, at 2. Despite the limitations to the CFPB’s authority created by Henson v. 
Santander, the agency continues to push “for a narrow interpretation of the debt collector 
definition . . . that enlarges its enforcement power over the debt collection industry.” Thomas et al., 
supra note 21, at 493. 
 103. Thomas et al., supra note 21, at 493. The Outline points out that the Dodd-Frank Act, which 
created the CFPB, covers “creditors who are collecting or attempting to collect on debts that relate to a 
consumer financial product or service.” CFPB, supra note 31, at 3. 
 104. CFPB, supra note 31, at 4. Specifically, the proposals would affect “small entities” in the 
categories listed but would not have an impact on every small entity in every line of business. Id. 
 105. Id. at 8. The proposals under consideration would require debt collectors to review the 
information contained in the debt portfolio to look for indications of uncertainty about the adequacy or 
accuracy of the information for a particular debtor or for the portfolio information as a whole. Id. 
 106. Id. 
 107. Yuka Hayashi, White House Criticizes CFPB for Naming Own Temporary Chief, WALL ST. J. 
(Nov. 25, 2017, 8:52 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/white-house-criticizes-cfpb-for-naming-own-
temporary-chief-1511631996 [https://perma.cc/R6T6-P3L9]. The power struggle between the Trump 
Administration and the CFPB intensified when CFPB Director Richard Cordray resigned from his 
position without giving a reason for his departure. Yuka Hayashi, CFPB Head Cordray to Step down, 
Paving Way for Change at Watchdog, WALL ST. J. (Nov. 15, 2017, 2:35 PM), 
https://www.wsj.com/articles/cfpb-director-richard-cordray-to-step-down-1510766617 
[https://perma.cc/LRD3-F9JR]. On his way out, Mr. Cordray, relying on language in the Dodd-Frank 
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The CFPB wanted to do something to ensure that the collection of 
these debts remain regulated. The CFPB could effectively regulate 
debt purchasers by proposing additional requirements on the debt 
collectors that service the purchased debt portfolios.108 However, the 
Bureau will have to figure out its own internal power struggle before 
it can make any progress on rulemaking. 
III.   Proposal 
Consumer protection laws and financial regulations need to evolve 
to reflect the large role that debt purchasers play in the debt 
collection industry. Congress should provide clarity about the types 
of entities that are subject to the requirements of the FDCPA. 
Without adapted statutes and regulations that provide clarity, the 
current state of the law requires debt purchasers to play a guessing 
game that questions how vulnerable they might be to liability. 
Similarly, millions of debtors have few options for seeking 
compensation if they feel harmed by the actions of debt 
purchasers.109 
                                                                                                                 
Act, named Deputy Director Leandra English as the interim director, but President Donald Trump used 
the Federal Vacancies Reform Act of 1998 to appoint Mick Mulvaney, the director of the White House 
Office of Management and Budget, to the interim position. Miles Parks, Who’s in Charge? An Awkward 
Monday Is Coming for This Federal Agency, NPR (Nov. 25, 2017, 5:40 PM), 
https://www.npr.org/sections/thetwo-way/2017/11/25/566477507/whos-in-charge-an-awkward-monday-
is-coming-for-consumer-financial-protection-bur?utm_source=dlvr.it&utm_medium=twitter 
[https://perma.cc/QDV7-E84C]. Ms. English and Mr. Mulvaney jockeyed for position as acting director 
on the Monday after Thanksgiving 2017 with Mr. Mulvaney arriving at the CFPB office with a bag full 
of donuts and later meeting with top officials before holding a press conference, and Ms. English sent an 
e-mail to employees saying that she is the director before meeting with Senate Democrats. Yuka 
Hayashi & Lalita Clozel, Trump Asserts Control over Agency, WALL ST. J., Nov. 28, 2017, at A1, A4. 
 108. CFPB, supra note 31, at 8. The proposal “address[es] attempts to shift responsibility for the 
accuracy of information about debts in portfolios from debt owners to collectors.” Id. “As with the 
fundamental information, collectors need not obtain the representation of accuracy [to] possess a 
reasonable basis for claims of indebtedness, but they would have to justify an alternative approach.” Id. 
 109. See S. REP. NO. 95-382, at 2 (1977), as reprinted in 1977 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1695, 1697. Part of 
Congress’s reason for the FDCPA was that nearly forty percent of Americans had no legitimate way to 
respond to debt collection abuse. Id. There was a glaring lack of state law at the time, with thirteen states 
having no debt collection laws and another eleven states having laws that provided little to no 
protection. Id. at 2–3. 
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A.   Option One: Statutory Clarity 
Congressional amendment provides the best solution. In 
concluding its opinion in Henson v. Santander, the Supreme Court 
called on Congress to fix the problem, hinting that this is the favored 
solution.110 There are certainly questions about whether institutions 
like Santander are more likely to engage in abusive conduct when 
they profess their principal business purpose to be lending rather than 
debt purchasing.111 The Court did not offer any solutions or answers 
to questions like this one but only provided that the answer is a 
matter for Congress, not the Supreme Court.112 
1.   Limiting the Debt Collector Definition and Implementing 
New Requirements 
Congress could follow the Supreme Court’s lead and completely 
exclude debt purchasers from the reach of the FDCPA and do 
nothing to regulate them. However, this solution runs the risk of 
returning a significant portion of debt collection activity to its pre-
FDCPA state: debt collectors calling debtors at dinnertime, using 
obscene and profane language, and threatening the use of violence 
while attempting to collect debts.113 
Congress could provide the most clarity by enacting an entirely 
new statute that applies only to debt purchasers. This seems to be the 
type of statute that the Supreme Court contemplates in the conclusion 
of Henson v. Santander.114 In the process, Congress should amend 
                                                                                                                 
 110. Henson v. Santander Consumer USA, Inc., 137 S. Ct. 1718, 1726 (2017) (“[T]he proper role of 
the judiciary . . . [is] to apply, not amend, the work of the People’s representatives.”). 
 111. Id. at 1725. 
 112. Id. 
 113. Id. at 1720; S. REP. NO. 95-382, at 1. Before Congress enacted the FDCPA, the Consumer 
Affairs Subcommittee held hearings that revealed that independent debt collectors caused the most 
severe “suffering and anguish” on the debtors that they contact. S. REP. NO. 95-382, at 1–2. In addition 
to the forms of abuse mentioned above, Congress reported that debt collectors frequently revealed a 
consumer’s personal information to family members, friends, neighbors, and employers; the debt 
collectors also obtained personal consumer information via pretending to be a public or government 
official and imitating legal processes. Id. at 2. 
 114. Henson, 137 S. Ct. at 1725 (“We have no difficulty imagining, for example, a statute that applies 
the Act’s demands to anyone collecting any debts, anyone collecting debts originated by another, or to 
 
21
Haan: Gorsuch's Purgatory: Attempting to Define Debt Collector Under th
Published by Reading Room,
454 GEORGIA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 35:2 
the FDCPA by eliminating the clause that defines a debt collector as 
any entity having a principal business purpose of collecting debts.115 
This would remove any confusion and speculation about an entity’s 
principal business purpose, making it irrelevant to the debt collector 
inquiry. Determining an entity’s principal business purpose could be 
far too difficult.116 Thus, the FDCPA would only define a debt 
collector as one who “regularly collects or attempts to collect, 
directly or indirectly, debts owed or due or asserted to be owed or 
due another.”117 The Supreme Court decided that debt purchasers are 
not debt collectors, so they should not be subject to a statute that only 
applies to debt collectors.118 
This does not mean that debt purchasers would go completely 
unregulated. A new statute should impose requirements on debt 
purchasers at the time that they acquire a debt portfolio to ensure that 
debt purchasers do not engage in discriminatory or abusive behavior. 
Debt purchasers often obtain very little information about the debts 
within a portfolio, sometimes receiving only a computerized 
summary of the creditor’s business records.119 A new statute should 
make debt purchasers directly liable for not verifying certain data 
points before they either collect or attempt to collect the debt for 
themselves or send it to a debt collection attorney to do so.120 
Verifying account media, including monthly statements, charge off 
dates, and recent payments for credit debts, as well as indicating the 
presence of any recent complaints, would go a long way to ensure 
that debt purchasers are not attempting to collect on bad debts. 
Further, the new statute should be a strict liability statute, whose 
imposed liability mimics those imposed under the FDCPA.121 
                                                                                                                 
some other class of persons still.”). 
 115. 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(6) (2012). 
 116. See supra discussion Part II.A.2. 
 117. See supra discussion Part II.A.2. 
 118. Henson, 137 S. Ct. at 1721–22. 
 119. ROBERT J. HOBBS ET AL., FAIR DEBT COLLECTION VOL. 1, 24 (9th ed. 2018). 
 120. The National Consumer Law Center points out that one of the largest problems with debt 
purchasers is that companies selling debt portfolios do not guarantee the accuracy of the information 
contained in a portfolio, but debt purchasers maintain that the information received is correct. Id. 
 121. 15 U.S.C. § 1692k (2012); McCall v. Drive Fin. Servs., 440 F. Supp. 2d 388, 390 (E.D. Pa. 
 
22
Georgia State University Law Review, Vol. 35, Iss. 2 [], Art. 5
https://readingroom.law.gsu.edu/gsulr/vol35/iss2/5
2019] GORSUCH'S PURGATORY 455 
2. New Requirements Benefit Debt Purchasers and Collection 
Attorneys 
Imposing liability for failing to meet the required verification 
points would benefit the debt purchasers. By requiring debt 
purchasers to verify information about the debts they receive from 
creditors, debt purchasers will know that they are purchasing valid 
debts.122 This would prevent debt purchasers from spending money 
on a debt portfolio only to find that a significant portion of the 
portfolio contains bad or expired debts.123 
The benefits of the new requirements would improve the 
efficiency of collection attorneys as well, should a debt purchaser 
choose to use a law firm to attempt to collect its debts.124 First, by 
imposing verification requirements on debt purchasers at the time of 
debt portfolio acquisition, lawyers and law firms will be in a better 
position to make appropriate decisions about each debt. Verification 
from the debt purchaser will allow the collection attorneys to pursue 
only valid debts, which would lower the chance that collection 
attorneys will file a claim that eventually gets dismissed due to a 
statute of limitations issue or a previous discharge in bankruptcy. 
Second, as claims on bad debts decrease in frequency, the debt 
collection law firms and their attorneys will become less vulnerable 
to lawsuits defending FDCPA allegations, resulting in more time and 
money spent on the lawful collection of debts.125 
                                                                                                                 
2006) (explaining that the maximum potential liability of debt collectors is $1,000 for an individual 
plaintiff). 
 122. A result of the lack of information received by debt purchasers is the prevalence of debts already 
settled, debts belonging to another person, or debts in the wrong amount. HOBBS ET AL., supra note 119, 
at 25. 
 123. Id. at 13. 
 124. The law firms that collect debt for debt purchasers are, right now, subject to the FDCPA because 
they collect debt “owed . . . another.” 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(6) (2012). However, Michigan Congressman 
David Trott proposed a bill, the Practice of Law Technical Clarification Act of 2017, that would amend 
the FDCPA to exclude “law firms and licensed attorneys who are engaged in activities related to legal 
proceedings from the definition of a debt collector,” thus making law firms exempt from the FDCPA. 
Practice of Law Technical Clarification Act of 2017, H.R. 1849, 115th Cong. (2017). The proposed 
legislation would also limit the CFPB’s power to reach attorneys acting in this manner. Id. 
 125. See Miljkovic v. Shafritz & Dinkin, P.A., 791 F.3d 1291, 1304 (11th Cir. 2015) (“Guided by 
Supreme Court precedent and the plain language of the FDCPA, we find that the Act applies to the 
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Finally, the new requirements will continue to further the 
FDCPA’s purpose.126 Debt collection law firms and lawyers that 
adhere to the FDCPA should not have to face unfair competition 
from law firms that intentionally commit prohibited acts or choose to 
ignore the statute when attempting to collect debts. The verification 
requirements for debt purchasers will effectively keep frequent 
violators out of the debt collection market. 
B.   Option Two: CFPB Regulations for Debt Purchasers 
The CFPB can provide a smaller-scale solution by issuing 
regulations that apply to debt purchasers outside the reach of the 
FDCPA. Just as the Supreme Court calls on Congress to provide 
statutory clarity, the Court also seems to call on the CFPB to issue 
regulations that reach debt purchasers.127 Pursuant to its rulemaking 
authority, the CFPB can issue the specific requirements contemplated 
in Option One.128 Even though debt purchasers are exempt from the 
FDCPA, the CFPB would not be outside of its authority by regulating 
debt purchasers because Dodd-Frank covers creditors who are 
collecting or attempting to collect on debts that relate to a consumer 
financial product or service.129 One of the CFPB’s practices in the 
                                                                                                                 
litigating activities of lawyers and law firms engaged in consumer debt collection, subject only to the 
limited exceptions Congress has chosen to include in the statute.”). 
 126. Cuaresma et al., supra note 20, at 2. 
 127. Henson v. Santander Consumer USA, Inc., 137 S. Ct. 1718, 1725–26 (2017). The Court points 
out that it is “hardly unknown for new business models to emerge in response to regulation and for 
regulation in turn to address new business models.” Id. In this statement, the Court almost takes the 
position of “you caused this problem, now it is your job to fix it.” See id. 
 128. 15 U.S.C. § 1692l(d) (2012); see also supra Part II.B.2 and accompanying text. 
 129. CFPB, supra note 31, at 3. Under the proposed Financial CHOICE Act, the CFPB would become 
the Consumer Law Enforcement Agency and have no control over its budget or the ability to pursue 
unfair, abusive, and deceptive practices of financial services companies, but it is unclear whether the 
Consumer Law Enforcement Agency would continue to have similar rulemaking authority possessed by 
the CFPB. Erik Sherman, GOP Takes Aim at a Consumer Protection Agency and Post-Collapse Bank 
Regulations, FORBES.COM (June 8, 2017, 6:31 PM), 
https://www.forbes.com/sites/eriksherman/2017/06/08/gop-takes-aim-at-a-consumer-protection-agency-
and-post-collapse-bank-regulations/#50274c5a4b24 [https://perma.cc/XLF7-QNLL]. The Financial 
CHOICE Act would accordingly replace any reference to the CFPB within the FDCPA with references 
to the Consumer Law Enforcement Agency. Financial CHOICE Act of 2017, H.R. 10, 115th 
Cong. § 711 (2017). 
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past has been imposing limits on future actions of debt collection law 
firms as part of settlements reached between the Bureau and the law 
firm.130 However, the CFPB should not regulate the practice of law 
by enjoining law firms from filing collection lawsuits on behalf of 
debt purchasers without attaching “a chronological listing of the 
names of all the prior owners of the [d]ebt and the date of each 
transfer of ownership of the [d]ebt.”131 Instead, the CFPB should 
regulate the debt purchasers only by requiring each debt purchaser to 
obtain information reflecting the opening of a debtor’s account and 
any payments made to the account. 
C.   Option Three: Wait and See 
Congress and the CFPB could always wait and see how courts will 
interpret the practical implications of Henson v. Santander. An 
interpretation is not likely to come from the Supreme Court given the 
conclusion of its opinion.132 As noted above, the Court does not seem 
inclined to answer any further questions about how the principal 
purpose prong applies to a debt purchaser.133 Accordingly, 
interpretation of the FDCPA in the wake of Henson v. Santander, as 
applied to debt purchasers, would have to come from federal district 
and appellate courts. This “solution” has one crucial practical 
implication: more confusion in the search for clarity. 
If Congress and the CFPB defer to district and appellate courts, the 
answer will likely yield results that return debt collection to the same 
position it occupied before Henson v. Santander when the debate 
over mutual exclusivity created a circuit split.134 Henson v. Santander 
virtually eliminated the inquiry into the defaulted status of a debt for 
                                                                                                                 
 130. Stipulated Final Judgment & Order at 6, CFPB v. Frederick J. Hanna & Assocs., P.C., 114 F. 
Supp. 3d 1342 (N.D. Ga. 2016) (No. 1:14-cv-02211-AT). 
 131. Id. at 7. The Consent Order in the Hanna case also imposed requirements on individual attorneys 
acting for the law firm. Id. at 7–9. 
 132. Henson, 137 S. Ct. at 1725; see discussion supra Part I.C. 
 133. Henson, 137 S. Ct. at 1725. 
 134. See generally Cuaresma et al., supra note 20, at 2 (explaining that the FDCPA does not address 
instances when an entity meets the statutory standards for both a creditor and a debt collector, creating a 
circuit split on how to classify purchasers of “nonperforming or defaulted accounts”). 
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purposes of determining an entity’s role in debt collection.135 Thus, 
district and appellate courts are no longer bound by their precedents 
regarding mutual exclusivity and are free to decide however they 
choose whether a debt purchaser’s principal business purpose is debt 
collection. 
The potential that circuits will answer this question in different 
ways makes it plausible that a court in one circuit would determine a 
debt purchaser’s principal business purpose to be debt collection, 
whereas a court in a different circuit would determine that the same 
debt purchaser’s principal business purpose is something other than 
debt collection. This creates an inconsistency where a given debt 
purchaser, like Midland Credit Management, could be subject to the 
FDCPA in “Circuit A,” but exempt from it in “Circuit B.”136 
Consequently, the remedies provided by the FDCPA would be 
available to a harmed consumer in Circuit A but not available to a 
harmed consumer in Circuit B. 
CONCLUSION 
Henson v. Santander seemingly exempted a significant portion of 
the debt collection industry from the reach of the FDCPA.137 A debt 
purchaser is not a debt collector because it owns the debts it is 
attempting to collect instead of owing it to another entity.138 
However, the Supreme Court decision did not address whether a debt 
purchaser collecting on debts that it owns qualifies as a debt collector 
if its principal business purpose is the collection of debt.139 
The presence of debt purchasers in the debt collection industry has 
drastically increased in recent years, leaving millions of American 
                                                                                                                 
 135. Henson, 137 S. Ct. at 1721 (“Neither does [the statute’s] language appear to suggest that we 
should care how a debt owner came to be a debt owner—whether the owner originated the debt or came 
by it only through a later purchase.”). 
 136. See ENCORE CAPITAL GRP., supra note 77 and accompanying text. 
 137. Henson, 137 S. Ct. at 1721–22. 
 138. Id. at 1724. 
 139. 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(6) (2012); Henson, 137 S. Ct. at 1725. 
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debtors subject to demands for payment.140 With such a large group 
of entities exempt from the FDCPA, millions of American debtors 
are without a definite remedy if they feel harmed by a debt purchaser. 
First, Congress should amend the FDCPA to eliminate the 
principal business prong from the section defining a debt collector.141 
Second, Congress should enact a law that imposes consequences on 
debt purchasers if they fail to verify certain data points about each 
debt within a portfolio at the time of acquisition. The proposed 
changes will provide some reassurance to debtors that debt 
purchasers are contacting them about legitimate debts while 
simultaneously improving the efficiency of collection by debt 
purchasers. Many questions exist, but it is quite certain that the 
Supreme Court does not wish to address this topic in the near 
future.142 Without solutions from Congress and the CFPB, the lower 
courts are sure to resurrect the circuit split in a new form, leaving 
millions of American consumers seeking a remedy for their harm in 
legal purgatory. 
 
                                                                                                                 
 140. HOBBS ET AL., supra note 119, at 13. In the ten years between 1993 and 2004, the amount of 
consumer debt sold to debt purchasers increased from an estimated $660 million to $57 billion. Id. The 
face value of the purchased debts was $110 billion. Id. 
 141. 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(6). 
 142. Henson, 137 S. Ct. at 1725. 
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